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604 IN RE HAYES [70 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 11647. In Bank. Mar 17, 1969.] 
In re DAVID OIJIVER HAYES on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Criminal Law-Double Punishment-Scope of Statutes.-Pen. 
Code, § 654, proscribing mUltiple punishment, governs viola-
tions not only of the Penal Code, but also of the penal 
provisions of other codes, including the Vehicle Code. 
[2] Id.-Identity of Offenses-Multiple Punishment: Application· 
of Tests.-If the statutory proscription against multiple pun-
ishment (Pen. Code, § 654) applies under any enunciated test 
employed to determine its applicability, a contrary result 
under another test is irrelevant. 
[3a,3b] Id.-Identity of Offenses-Multiple Punishment: Applica-
tion of Tests.-The "act or omission" that entails multiple 
criminal violations for which multiple punishment is precluded 
under Pen. Code, § 654, relates only to a criminal act or 
omission, just as the single "intent and objective" held under 
decisional law to preclude multiple punishment for a series of 
criminal acts relates only to a single criminal intent and 
motive. The proper approach, to determine whether the stat-
ute applies, is first to isolate the criminal acts involved and 
then to examine them for identity. 
[ 4a-4c] Id.-Identity of Offenses-Multiple Punishment: Applica-
tion of Testa.-One who drove a vehicle while under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor and with the knowledge that his 
license had been suspended was guilty of two criminal acts, 
namely violation of Veh. Code, § 23102, and violation of Veh. 
Code, § 14601, respectively, and it was immaterial that both 
criminal acts were committed simultaneously or that they 
shared the single act, and the single intent and objective, of 
driving from one place to another, conduct that in and of itself 
is neutral and noncriminal. (Disapproving People v. Morris, 
237 Cal.App.2d 773 [47 Cal.Rptr. 253], to the extent that ob-
servations therein on multiple prosecutions might relate to a 
multiple punishment problem.) 
[5] Id.-Double Prosecution: Double Punishment Distinguished.-
The preclusion of multiple prosecution under Pen. Code, § 654, 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 269.5; Am.Jur.2d, Criminal 
Law, § 189. 
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 173 et seq; Am.Jur.2d, 
Criminal Law, § 165 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 1475(1); [2, 3] 
Criminal Law, §§ 140(5), 1475(1); [4] Criminal Law, §§ 140(5); 
Automobiles and Other Road Vehicles, §§ 387a, 388; [5] Criminal 
Law, §§ 66.5,1475(1). 
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is separate and distinct from its preclusion of multiple pun-
ishment. The rule against multiple prosecutions is a procedural 
safeguard against harassment and is not necessarily related to 
the punishment to be imposed, and double prosecution may be 
precluded even when double punishment is permissible. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to review the imposition 
of two sentences for the simultaneous violation of two un-
related penal provisions of the Vehicle Code. Order to show 
cause discharged; writ denied. 
Kenneth M. Wells, Public Defender, and Charles G. Fred-
ericks, Assistant Public Defender, for Petitioner. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, Assist-
ant Attorney General, Edsel W. Haws and Arnold O.Overoye, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent. 
MOSK, J.-On December 30, 1966, petitioner David Oliver 
Hayes drove a motor vehicle for some 13 blocks in violation of 
Vehicle Code section 14601 (with knowledge of a suspended 
license) and Vehicle Code section 23102 (while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor). He pleaded guilty to ~nd 
was sentenced for both offenses. Petitioner now asserts that 
imposition of sentences for both violations is contrary to the 
. proscription against multiple punishment contained in Penal 
Code section 654. We have concluded that petitioner's conten-
tion lacks merit. 
[1] Section 654 provides that ee An act or omission which 
is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of 
this code may be punished under either of such provisions. 
but in no case can it be punished under more than one. . . ." 
The interdiction is not limited to the provisions of the Penal 
Code, but embraces penal provisions in other codes as well, 
including those found in the Vehicle Code. (Neal v. State of 
California (1960) 55 Ca1.2d 11, 18 fn. 1 [9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 
357 P.2d 839] ; People v. Kehoe (1949) 33 Ca1.2d 711 [204 
P.2d 321].) 
[2] The key to application of section 654 is in the phrase 
"act or omission": a defendant may be punished only once 
for each distinct "act or omission" committed. There have 
been numerous attempts in the cases to define a single "act," 
with varying degrees of clarity. Section 654 has been held to 
apply, for example, where the multiple violations are "neces-
sarily included offenses" (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal. 
'i 
': 
, 
, 
606 IN RE HAYES [70 C.2d 
2d 175, 186 [217 P.2d 1]) and where there is a single "intent 
and objective" underlying a course of criminal ,conduct 
(N cal v. State of California (1960) supra, 55 Ca1.2d 11) but 
not where there are multiple victims (id.). Most of the cases 
construing section 654 can be resolved by application of one 
or the other of these theories. (See, e.g., In re Ford (1961) 66 
Ca1.2d 183 [57 Cal.Rptr. 129, 424 P.2d 681] [kidnaping of 
three victims] ; In re Ward (1966) 64 Ca1.2d 672 [51 Cal. 
Rptr. 272, 414 P.2d 400] [kidnaping with intent to rob and 
robbery] ; People v. Brown (1958) 49 Cal.2d 577 [320 P.2d 5] 
[abortion and resulting death]; People v. Craig (1941) 17 
Ca1.2d 453 [110 P.2d 403] [rape and statutory rape] ; People 
v. Pater (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 921 [73 Cal.Rptr. 823] 
[grand theft-auto and driving vehicle without owner's con-
sent].) Unfortunately, these formulae are of only limited 
utility in the instant case, and we therefore begin anew with 
a direct analysis of the statute and its application to the facts 
before us.1 
To put petitioner's entire adventure into a few words: he 
drove his car with an invalid license and while intoxicated. 
Initially, it is temptingly easy to extract, as petitioner urges 
us to do, the single act of "driving," obviously common to 
both of the charged offenses, and to apply section 654 to this 
case on the theory that" driving" was petitioner's only "act 
or omission." However, to do so would be no more justified 
than to extract the act of "possession" from a charge of 
possessing two different items of contraband, an approach 
long rejected by our courts. (E.g., People v. Schroeder (1968) 
264 Cal.App.2d 217, 227-228 [70 Cal.Rptr. 491] [multi-
ple punishment for simultaneous possession of various nar-
cotic drugs, not precluded by section 654]; People v. Lock-
wood (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 75, 82-83 [61 Cal.Rptr. 131] 
[same] ; People v. Lopez (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 344, 350-351 
[337 P.2d 570] [same]; People v. Mandell (1949) 90 Cal.App. 
2d 93, 98-99 [202 P.2d 348] [same]; People v. Wasley (1966) 
245 Cal.App.2d 383 [53 Cal.Rptr. 877] [possession of diifer-
ent illegal weapons] ; cf. People v. Schroeder, supra, 264 Cal. 
App.2d at pp. 228-229 [possession of single narcotic a sin-
gle offense] ; People v. Branch (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 490 [260 
lOur analysis herein is iu no way intended to preclude application of 
the above tests where appropriate, any more than those tests themselves 
are mutually exclusive. It is only because we find aU the foregoing formu. 
lae inapplicable that we resort to the present approach. If under any of 
the enunciated tests the proscription of section 654 applies, a contrary 
result under another test is irrelevant. 
\ 
\ 
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P.2d 27] [possession and sale of same narcotic].) [Sa] We 
cannot overlook the crucial element: section 654 rcfers 
not to any physical act or omission which might perchance be 
common to all of a defendant's violations, but to a defend-
ant's criminal acts or omissions. (See, e.g., In re Johnson 
(1966) 65 Cal.2d 393, 395 [54 Cal.Rptr. 873, 420 P.2d 393] ; 
People v. Quinn (1964) 61 Ca1.2d 551, 555 [39 Cal.Rptr. 393, 
393 P.2d 705] ; People v. Brown (1958) supra, 49 Ca1.2d 577, 
590; People v. Branch, supra, 119 Cal.App.2d at p. 496.) 2 
Indeed, section 654 itself makes this distinction evident, 
since it refers to an act or omission "made punishable" by 
different statutes.3 The neutral act of driving, like the mere 
act of possession in the foregoing cases, when viewed in a 
vacuum, is not' 'made punishable" by any statute. 
The proper approach, therefore, is to isolate the various 
criminal acts involved, and then to examine only those acts 
for identity. [48.] In the instant case the two criminal acts 
are (1) driving with a suspended license and (2)' driving 
while intoxicated; they are in no sense identical or equivalent. 
Petitioner is not being punished twice-because he cannot be 
punished at all-for the "act of driving." He is being penal-
ized once for his act of driving with an invalid license and 
once for his independent act of driving while intoxicated.' 
Moreover, we must not confuse simultaneity with identity: 
in both of the above situations----driving as in this case and 
possession of contraband in the cited cases-the defendant 
committed two simultaneous criminal acts, which coinciden-
tally had in common an identical noncriminal act. The two 
simultaneous criminal acts of possessing substance X and pos-
sessing substance Y share the common, "neutral" act of pos-
sessing, just as they necessarily share the common factor of 
lack of a valid prescription for the drugs. Likewise, the two 
2The language in J'ohn801l. is typical: "The basic principle that forbids 
mUltiple punishment for one criminal act [citations] precludes infliction 
of more than one punishment for [a] series of acts directed toward one 
criminal objective •••• " (Italics added.) (65 Ca1.2d at p. 395 (per 
Traynor, C. J.).} 
8Compare former section 1938 of the New York Penal Law, referred 
to in Neal as "identical with" section 654, which uses the specific lan-
guage, "An act or omission which is made criminal and punishable. 
• • ." (Italics added.) 
'On the other hand, the single criminal act of driving with knowledge 
of an invalid license is arguably "made punis}lable" by both Vehicle 
Code section 14601 (driving with a suspended or revoked license) and 
Vehicle Code section 12500 (unlicensed driving); and section 654 would 
therefore preclude multiple punishment under both sections. 
) 
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simultaneous-but distinct-criminal acts of driving with a 
suspended license and driving while intoxicated share the 
common, noncriminal act of driving. I) On the date in question 
petitioner's act of driving was criminal and simultaneously 
violated two statutes because and only because of the presence 
of both the unrelated accompanying acts of voluntary intoxi-
cation and knowing possession of a suspended license. Simi-
larly, for example, if an individual went for a walk in pos· 
session of a loaded gun while he was intoxicated and 
unclothed, he would by the single neutral act of walking-or, 
more accurately, being in a "public place "-simultaneously 
viola.te three separate and unrelated statutes. (Pen. Code, 
§§ 12031, subd. (a); 647, subd. (f); 314.)6 Those three stat· 
utes, however, would be violated not by the one noncriminal 
act of being in a public place but necessarily by three simul· 
taneous though separate criminal acts. Once again, we must 
distinguish identical noncriminal acts from simultaneous 
criminal a.cts "made punishable" by law.T 
In attempting to equate simultaneity with identity, peti-
tioner argues that "There was no evidence his driving with· 
out a license preceded the commencement of the driving while 
liAs a further illustration of the analogy: Petitioner could be said to. 
have driven in possession of a suspended license and in "possession" (in 
his system) of intoxicating liquor. Again, possession is the neutral or 
noncriminal identical 'factor; but the criminal acts are distinctive. 
°Petitioner attaches significance to the fact that driving was an essen-
tial element in both of his offenses, citing a statement first made in 
In re Ohapman (1954) 43 Cal.2d 385, 390 [273 P.2d 817]: "It is on17. 
when the two offenses are committed by the 8ame act or when that aot 
is essential to both that they may not both be punished.' I. (Italics 
added.) Aside from the dubious vitality of this dic~um (see Peopltl v. 
Oollins (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 563, 579 [33 Cal.Rptr. 638]), "essen-
tiality" in and of itself was and is not a sufficient test ot the applica-
bility of section 654. On closer scrutiny, in tact, the quoted statement 
itself presupposes the existence of a single ("same") act; and we have 
seen that the only single acts that are relevant tor purposes ot section 
654 are criminal acts. In the example suggested above, none of the hypo-
thetical acts is a crime if committed in private i thus being or walking in 
a public place, like driving in the instant case or like possession and lack 
of a prescription in the narcotics example, is a necessary element in all 
three crimes. Yet this fact does not make those neutral elements in them-
. selves punishable or criminal, for none is by itself a complete criminal 
act. Thus the fortuitous identity of "essential" neutral elements remains 
irrelevant for our purposes. 
7To the possession and driving examples might well be added the cases 
which permit multiple punishment where a single criminal act haa more 
than one victim. (See Neal v. State of Oalifornia (1960) supra, 55 Cal.2d 
11, 20-21, and cases therein cited.) There might, tor example, be one 
common act of shooting a gun, but distinct criminal acts ot killing victim 
X and killing victim Y. However, as we indicated in Neal, this particular 
test takes in additional considerations, such as degree ot culpability, 
which migbt be inappropriate to apply in other contexts. 
\ 
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under the influence." Thus if petitioner had begun driving 
while intoxicated at 11 :50 p.m., and at midnight his license 
had expired but he had continued to drive, he apparently 
would concede that he could be punished for the two distinct 
acts of driving while intoxicated (before midnight) and driv-
ing with an expired license (after midnight). This arbitrary 
and wholly artificial distinction is unpersuasive. While sep-
aration in time may, in some contexts, make the legal separa-
tion of acts more apparent (see, e.g., In re lVard (1966) 
supra, 64 Ca1.2d 672, 678; Seiterle v. Superior Oourt (1962) 
67 Ca1.2d 397, 401·403 [20 Cal.Rptr. 1, 369 P.2d 697] ; People 
v. Howell (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 787, 792 [54 Cal.Rptr. 
92]), the converse does not necessarily follow. Proximity in 
time between criminal events does not preclude multiple pun-
ishment (People v. Slobodion (1948) 31 Ca1.2d 555 [191 P.2d 
1]); and petitioner's acts were neither more nor less multiple 
because of the fortuitous fact that they were completely, 
rather than only partly, simultaneous. (People v. Wasley 
(1966) supra, 245 Cal.App.2d 383, 387.)8 
~ can we subscribe to a contention that because petitioner 
m~y have had only one "intent and objective "-driving-
: when he committed the two violations, he comes within the 
I ambit of the test established in Neal v. State of Oalifornia 
· (1960) supra, 55 Cal.2d 11. In Neal, the defenp.ant had 
attempted murder by means of arson (burning down the vic-
tims' house by igniting gasoline therein). We viewed that 
circumstance as an indivisible "course of criminal conduct," 
the criminal act of arson being only the means toward an 
ultimate criminal objective of murder. We stated that where 
there was only a single "intent and objective" involved in 
such a course of criminal conduct, section 654 precluded mul-
tiple punishment; 
Here neither of the two violations can realistically be 
viewed as a "means" toward the other and as such a part of 
a single course of criminal conduct, in the sense that the arson 
in Neal was committed not to burn property but only as a 
8The Attorney General, in apparent answer to petitioner's argument, 
has made a belated attempt to establish that petitioner may have been 
observed by the arresting officer at two different times, so that technically 
the offenses charged were not "simultaneous." It is just such strained 
rationale that a test dependent on simultaneity would engender. As stated 
in People v. Pater (1968) supra, 267 Cal.App.2d 921, 926, a "neces-
sarily included offense" case, "Neither clocks, calendars nor county 
boundaries convert one continuing course of conduct into a series of 
criminal acts." 
70 C.JcS-ZO 
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means toward the single objective of murder. Moreover, the 
petitioner's intent and objective to drive from one place to 
another is no more relevant to our analysis than what he 
intended to do when he arrived there. (See In re Ward. 
(1966) supra, 64 Ca1.2d 672, 676.) [3b] Just as it is the' 
criminal "act or omission" to which section 654 refers, it is 
the criminal" intent and objective" that we established as 
the test in Neal. (E.g., I'll re Johnson (1966) supra, 65 Cal.2d 
393, 395 [intent to sell heroin] ; I'll re Ward (1966) supra, 64 
Ca1.2d 672, 676 [intent to rob].) In Neal we found to be 
crucial 110t the defendant's possible intent and objective to 
acquire money, to gain revenge or to ignite gasoline, but only 
his intent and objective to commit murder.9 Although the 
absence of a single intent and objective does not necessarily 
preclude application of section 654 (see fn. 1 ante), it is clear 
that under the instant circumstances this test of Neal cannot 
be of aid to defendant. 
[4b] Petitioner relies heavily upon People v. Morris 
(1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 773 [47 Cal.Rptr. 253], which ·in a 
similar factual situation declared that section 654 proscribed 
multiple prosecutions for drunk driving and an invalid 
license. lO [5] As we pointed out in Neal, however, "Sec-
tion 654's preclusion of multiple prosecution is separate and 
distinct from its preclusion of multiple punishment. The rule 
against . multiple prosecutions is a procedural safeguard 
against harassment and is not necessarily related to the pun-
ishment to be imposed; double prosecution may be precluded 
even when double punishment is permissible." (Italics 
added.) Neal v. State of Oalifornia (1960) supra, 55 Ca1.2d 
11, 21.) [40] Therefore we need not reexamine at this time 
the validity of the conclusions in Morris as to multiple .prose-
cutions, other than to observe that they are disapprOVed to the 
extent they might relate to a multiple punishment problem.l1 
9Thus had the defendant there had the completely independent crim-
inal objectives of murder (perhaps for vengeance) and burning the house 
(to collect fire insurance), or had he attempted to kill his victims with 
a gun and then set fire to their house as an afterthought, he would have 
been punishable for both arson and attempted murder. (See PeopltJ V. 
Massie (1967) 66 Ca1.2d 899, 908 [59 Cal.Rptr. 733, 428 P.2d 869] ; 
Seiterle v. Superior Court (19U2) supra, 57 Ca1.2d 397, 401.) 
lOA majority of the Morris court, given substantially the same argu-
ment presented to us, rejecteJ tIle" criminal act" de1inition for section 
654 and appeared to apply the Chapman test of "essentiality." (But see 
dissent by Whelan, J., id., p. 777.) 
llWe note that even where the issue is multiple prosecution, the provi· 
sions of section 654 cannot be employed to Plislead the court. Thus if a 
\ 
\ 
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In summation, then, section 654 of the Penal Code pro-
scribes multiple punishment for a single "act or omission 
which is made punishable" by different statutes, i.e., a single 
criminal act or omission. Since the mere act of driving is 
made punishable by no statute, it is not the type of act or 
omission referred to in section 654. The acts "made punish-
able" which this petitioner committed were (1) driving with 
a suspended license and (2) driving while intoxicated, two 
separate and distinct criminal acts; that they were committed 
simultaneously and that they share in common the neutral 
noncriminal act of driving does not render petitioner's pun-
ishment for both crimes in conHict with Penal Code section 
654. 
The order to show cause is discharged, and the petition for 
writ of habeas corpus is denied. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., and Burke, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-I dissent. 
Section 654 of the Penal Code provides that "An act or 
omtSSion which is made punishable in different ways by differ-
ent provisions of this code may be punished under either of 
such provisions, but in no case lean it be punished under more 
than one. " Underlying this deceptively simple language is a 
legislative determination that essentially unitary criminal 
activity shall not be punished more than once regardless of 
how many distinct crimes it may comprise. The statute "has 
been applied not only where there was but one 'act' in the 
ordinary sense . . . but also where a course of conduct vio-
lated more than one statute and the problem was whether it 
comprised a divisible transaction which could be punished 
under more than one statute within the meaning of section 
654." (People v. Brown (1958) 49 Ca1.2d 577, 591 [320 P.2d 
5].) Since its application is not limited to cases in which the 
identical conduct violates two statutes or one offense is neces-
sarily included in the other l (Neal v. State of California 
greater violation is concealed in order to gain "immunity" by prosecu-
tion for a lesser crime, section 654 will not apply. (Kellett v. 8uperior 
Court (1966) 63 Ca1.2d 822, 827-828 [48 Cal.Rptr. 366, 409 P.2d 206]; 
Gail v. Municipal Oourt (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 1005 [66 Cal.Rptr. 91]; 
Hampton v. Municipal Oourt (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 689 [51 Cal.Rptr. 
760].) 
lFor example, a single act of statutory rape would in every case also 
constitute contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and the latter 
offense is therefore necessarily included in the former. (People v. Greer 
(1947) 30 CaUd 589, 597-598 [184 P.2d 512].) 
I 
) 
612 IN RE HAYES [70C.2d 
(1960) 55 Ca1.2d 11, 18 [9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839], and 
cases cited), the words an "act . . . made punishable . . . by 
different provisions" do not refer to the entire criminal con-
duct proscribed by each provision but to conduct significantly 
common to both. 
Thus, in People v. Logan (1953) 41 Ca1.2d 279, 290 [260 
P.2d 20], we held that a defendant who committed robbery by 
striking his victim with a baseball bat could be punished only 
once for that act, since the "one act of inflicting force with 
the bat cannot both be punished as assault with a deadly 
weapon and availed of by the People as the force necessary to 
constitute the crime of robbery." Although the act of strik-
ing the victim was not by itself made punishable by different 
provisions of the Penal Code, it nevertheless fell within sec-
tion 654 because it was an essential element of both the rob-
bery and the assault. (In re Ohapman (1954) 43 Ca1.2d 385, 
389 [273 P.2d 817].) 
Moreover, there is no requirement that the act common to 
both crimes be punishable before section 654 comes into play. 
In Neal v. State of Oalifornia, supra, 55 Cal.2d 11, the act 
common to both crimes was the act, not punishable by itself, 
of throwing lighted gasoline. It was made punishable as arson 
because the gasoline was thrown into a house and as at-
tempted murder because it was thrown onto human beings. 
Since it "is the singleness of the act and not of the' offense 
that is determinative" (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Ca1.2d 
175, 187 [217 P.2d 1]), Neal could not be punished for both 
of those crimes. In People v. Oraig (1941) 17 Cal.2d 453, 458 
[110 P.2d 403], the act common to both statutory and forcible 
rape was the act, innocent by itself, of sexual intercourse. 
(See In re Lane (1962) 58 Ca1.2d 99, 104 122 Cal.Rptr. 857, 
372 P.2d 897].) Although the additional elements of the force 
used and the age of the victim made the act punishable under 
different subdivisions of section 261 of the Penal Code,' the 
defendant could be punished only once. 
The foregoing cases control this case, for petitioner's single 
act of driving was an essential element, indeed the only active 
dement, of the two crimes charged, namely, driving with 
knowledge that his driving privilege was suspended (Veh. 
Code, § 14601) and d"iving while under the influence of intox-
icating liquor. (Vell. Code, § 23102.) 
Cases involving simultaneous possession of different items 
of contraband are obviously not to the contrary (e.g., People 
v. Schroeder (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 217, 227-228 [70 Cal. 
\ 
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Rptr. 491] [multiple punishment for simultaneous possession 
of various narcotic drugs, 110t precluded by section 654]; 
People v. Lockwood (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 75, 82-83 [61 Cal. 
Rptr. 131] [same]; People v. Lopez (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 
344,350-351 [337 P.2d 570] [same]; People v. Mandell (1949) 
90 Cal.App.2d 93, 98-99 [202 P.2d 348] [same]; People v. 
Wasley (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 383, 387 [53 Cal.Rptr. 877] 
[possession of different illegal weapons]; cf. People v. 
Schroeder, supra, 264 Cal.App.2d at pp. 228-229 [possession 
of single narcotic a single offense] ; People v. Branch (1953) 
119 CaI.App.2d 490, 495-496 [260 P.2d 27] [possession and 
sale of same narcotic]), for the possession of one item is not 
essential to the possession of another separate item. One does 
not possess in the abstract; possession is meaningless unless 
something is possessed. The possession of each separate item 
is therefore a separate act of possession. 
Of course, had petitioner been convicted of a "crime" of 
being intoxicated and a "crime" of knowing that his driving 
privilege was suspended, the possession cases would be in 
point and section 654 would not preclude punishing peti-ti~or both offenses even though he committed them simul-
taneously. In such a case there would be no act of petitioner 
common to the two crimes. Petitioner, however, was not con-
victed of being intoxicated and knowing that his driving priv-
ilege was suspended but of a single act of driving while intox-
icated and while his driving privilege was suspended. It is the 
singleness of that act that is determinative. 
The Attorney General contends, however, that Vehicle Code 
sections 14601 and 23102 have different public purposes di-
rected at distinct evils, and that the driver who violates both 
statutes simultaneously should be doubly punished because he 
is invading two social interests that the Legislature had des-
ignated for distinct protection by the enactment of two differ-
ent statutes. In a jurisdiction without a multiple punishment 
~le like that of Penal Code section 654, this "distinct evil" 
test might aid the courts in ascertaining whether the Legisla-
ture intended cumulative punishments for simultaneous viola-
tions of statutes like Vehicle Code sections 14601 and 23102. 
(See Twice in Jeopardy (1965) 75 Yale L.J. 262, 320; Kirch-
heimer, The Act, the Offense, and Double Jeopardy (1949) 58 
Yale L.J. 513, 523.) In California, however, when the rule of 
section 654 precluding multiple punishment applies, the 
courts cannot invoke the "distinct evil" test to evade that 
statutory rule. (But see People v. Winchell (1967) 248 Cal. 
) 
614 IN RE HAYES [70 C.2d 
App.2J 580, 596 [56 Cal.Rptr. 782] ; People v. Wasley, supra, 
245 Cal.App.2d 383, 386; People v. Poe (1965) 236 Cal.App. 
2d Supp. 928, 942 [47 Cal.Rptr. 670].) 2 
Moreover, any notion that a California court can multiply 
sentences because defendant's single act violates statutes that, 
in the court's view, vindicate different societal interests 
should have been dispelled by decisions such as People v. 
Brown, supra, 49 Ca1.2d 577, 590 (defendant cannot be sen-
tenced both for criminal abortion and for murder caused by 
the same act), and People v. Craig, supra, 17 Cal.2d 453, 457 
(defendant cannot be sentenced for both statutory rape and 
forcible rape committed by one act of intercourse forced upon 
a 16-year-old girl; compare, People v. McOoUum (1931) 116 
Cal.App. 55, 58 [2 P.2d 432], a prosecution for both statutory 
rape and incest resulting from defendant's one act of inter-
course with his 16-year-old daughter; the trial court correctly 
anticipated the Oraig decision, but the appellate court with-
held judgment on the question). 
The Attorney General contends that multiple punishment 
should be allowed in accord with the statement in Neal v. 
State of Oalifornia, supra, 55 Cal.2d 11, 20, that" the purpose 
of the protection against multiple punishment is to insure 
that the defendant's punishment will be commensurate with 
his criminal liability." The Neal opinion made the quoted 
statement in the course of an inquiry into legislativ~ purposea 
2Both Winchell and Wasley correctly upheld dual sentences for simul· 
taneous but different" acts." In Winchell the defendant simultaneously 
violated Penal Code section 12021, forbidding possession by an ex-convict 
of a pistol capable of being concealed on his person, and Penal.Code 
section 466, forbidding possession of "a picklock, crow, keybit, or other 
instrument or tool with intent feloniously to break or enter into any 
building." In Wasley the defendant simultaneously violated section 
12021, proscribing possession of a concealable pistol by an ex-convict, 
and section 12020, proscribing possession of a sawed-off shotgun by ~'any 
person." The decisions mention the different public purposes served by 
the two statutes violated by the respective defendants, but they do not 
purport to announce a "distinct evils" test contrary to section 654. 
Since possession of a physical object is an "act" within the meaning 
of section 654, the defendant who possesses two different kinds of contra-
band in violation of two different statutes is committing two different 
, , acts" of proscribed possession. 
The Poe case, supra, 236 Ca1.App.2d SUpPa 928, 942, unlike Winchell 
and Wasley, decided the double punishment issue erroneously and should 
therefore be disapproved. In Poe precisely the same conduct of the 
defendants was a trespass proscribed by Penal Code section 602, sub· 
division (j), and a contempt proscribed by Penal Code section 166, 
subdivision 4. The appellate court upheld dual sentences f?r this single 
"act" on the theory that the trespass was a crime agalUst property 
whereas contempt was a crime against the authority of the superior court. 
3It is a legislative, not a judicial, function to fix the extent of punish. 
ment that can be imposed for any particular crime or group of crimes. 
) 
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with respect to the extent of punishment of a defendant who 
criminally injures or kills more than one victim. In holding 
that section 654 does not forbid the separate punishment of a 
defendant's multiple crimes of violence that harm multiple 
victims, even though a single physical movement of the 
defendant is the one common cause of injuries or deaths of 
the several victims, Neal speaks of the multiple victim prob-
lem in terms of cuIpability 4 and consequences.5 Moreover, 
under the orthodox theory of crime on which the Legislature 
based the Penal Code, the act of killing A is essentially dis-
tinct from the act of killing B even when a single muscular 
contraction of the defendant is the common cause of both 
deaths. The concept of punishment "commensurate with his· 
criminal liability," used in Neal as an aid to the determina-
tion of legislative purpose in a multiple victim case, cannot be 
wrenched from that context and invoked in the present case to 
justify ignoring the controlling precedents upon which the 
court in Neal relied in holding that Neal could not be punished 
bJlt,.h for arson and attempted murder. 
/' The Attorney General aIso contends that petitioner's unin-
Subject only to constitutional limitations, the Legislature can define 
erimes and set their punishments as it sees fit. (Bell v. United States 
(1955) 349 U.S. 81, 82 [99 L.Ed. 905, 909, 75 S.Ct. 620]; People v. 
Knowle, (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 181 [217 P.2d 1]; In re RosenCf'antz 
(1928) 205 Cal. 534, 537-538 [271 P. 902].) The courts cannot impose 
criminal penalties for conduct that the Legislature has not made punish-
able (United States v. Wiltberger (1820) 18 U.S. 76, 93 [5 L.Ed. 37, 
42]; Matter of Ellsworth (1913) 165 Cal. 677,681 [133 P. 272]; Have-
meyer v. Superior Oourt (1890) 84 Cal. 327, 376 [24 P. 121, 18 Am.St. 
Rep. 192, 10 L.R.A. 627]; Pen. Code, § 15) or adjudge punishment in 
excess of that authorized by the Legislature. (PeopZe v. Lein (1928) 204 
Cal. 84, 87 [266 P. 536]; People v. Riley (1874) 48 Cal. 549; In r6 Rye 
(1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 594:, 596 [313 P.2d 914]; In re Oarmignani 
(1925) 71 Cal.App. 632, 633 [235 P. 1033].) The Legislature can and 
does command multiple punishments for some crimes (e.g., Pen. Code, 
§§ 67, 68, 98 [disqualification from or forfeiture of office in addition to 
any other punishment for certain offenses]) and it authorizes the courts 
in their discretion to impose multiple punishments for others (e.g., the 
familiar statutory provision that a crime is punishable by imprisonment, 
fine, or both). The Legislature could also, if it saw fit to do so, expressly 
command or authorize multiple sentences for a group of crimes, however 
elosely they might be related. Instead, the California Legislature, so far 
8S multiple sentences for related crimes are concerned, has seen fit to 
enact the general multiple punishment preclusion of section 654. 
4" A defendant who commits an act of violence with the intent to harm 
mOre than one person or by a means likely to cause harm to several per-
Bons is more culpable than' a defendant who harms only one person." 
(55 Ca1.2d at p. 20.) 
Ci"Seetion 654 is not ' .•. applicable where ••. one act has two 
results each of which is an act of violence against the person of a sepa-
rate individual.'" (55 Cal.2d at pp. 20-21, quoting from People v. 
Brannon (1924) 70 Cal.App. 225, 235-236 [233 P. 88].) 
) 
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terrupted and factually indivisible course of driving (see Peo-
ple v. ](ehoe (1949) 33 Cal.2d 711, 715 [204 P.2d 321]) can be 
split to permit multiple sentencing by application of the Neal 
"intent and objective" test (55 Cal.2d at p. 19) : "Whether 
a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives 
rise to more than one act within the 'meaning of section 654 
depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If all of the 
offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be 
punished for anyone of such offenses but not for more than 
one." That test was not designed to permit multiple sentenc-
ing that section 654 clearly forbids but to preclude improper 
mUltiplication of sentences when there is at least some argu-
able question as to the factual divisibility of defendant's 
course of criminal conduct.6 
6The Neal opinion stated its "intent and objective" test immediatelT 
after it had quoted from People v. Brown, 8upra, 49 Ca1.2d 511, 591, the 
comment that " Section 654 has been applied not only where there was 
but one I act' in the ordinary sense . . • but also where a course ot 
conduct violated more than one statute and the problem was whether it 
comprised a divisible transaction which could, be punished under more 
than one statute within the meaning of section 654." 
Neither Neal nor Brown presented any question of a " divisible" trans-
action. In each of those cases one factually indivisible act was a common 
element of defendant's violation of two statutes. In Neal the defendant 
threw and ignited gasoline with intent to and did commit both arson and 
attempted murder. In Brown the defendant's act that was intended to 
abort L also killed her. In both cases section ·654 forbade sentencing the 
defendant for the two .crimes committed by the one act, and there w~ 
no occasion to inquire whether his offenses were or were not I I incident 
to one objective." 
Other decisions cited in Neal and Brown, however, show that Neal'. 
I I intent and objective" test should guide the sentencing judge in cases 
presenting a "course ot action" or "transaction" that, by- oversubtle 
division of the evidence of acts and intents, could be split into a series 
of discrete crimes proscribed by different statutes directed against 
basically the same kind of criminality. (See, e.g., People v. Kehoe, supra, 
33 Ca1.2d 111, 113, 115; People v. Greer, supra, 30 Cal.2d 589, 603; 
compare People v. Slobodion (1948) 31 CaI.2d 555, 562 [191 P.2d 1].) 
In such cases the sentencing court is confronted with a state of facta 
that mayor may not come within I I the meaning of section 654" in the 
sense that, althollgh section 654 does not give a comprehensive or defini-
tive rule enabling the solution of all multiple sentencing problems, it 
does indicate a general legislative purpose of lenity so far as the multi-
plication of sentences is concerned. Sometimes (as in Greer) the statutes 
defining the separate' crimes in themselves will enable the court to ascer-
tain the legislative llurpose that they should not be separately punished, 
without resort to section 654. If, however, there remains a doubt as to 
the legislative purpose concerning the multiplication of sentences, the 
doubt should be resolved in favor of lenity. (In re Tartar (1959) 52 
Ca1.2d 250, 257 [339 P.2d 553]; People v. Ralph (1944) 24 Ca1.2d 575, 
:i81 r150 P.2d 401]; see In re Estrada (1965) 63 CaI.2d 740, 144-745 
[48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948].) In this class of cases "the meaning 
of section 654" and the "intent Rnll objective" test direct the courts 
toward lenity in the same way that a judicially recognized "basic prin· 
ciple that forbids multiple punishment for one criminal act" forbids 
) 
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There is no such arguable question in this case. Even if 
there were, Neal would support petitioner, for he had only the 
single intent and objective to get from one place to another. 
There is nothing in Neal to indicate that the intent and objec-
tive of the defendant must be criminal before it may be 
deemed relevant in determining whether a course of criminal 
conduct is not divisible so as to give rise to no more than one 
act within the meaning of section 654. Although the Neal case 
and the cases following it involved criminal intents and objec-
tives (see cases cited in footnote 6 supra), that fact is not 
controlling. It is wholly anomalous to seize on the innocence 
of the defendant's intent and objective as determinative just 
as it is wholly anomalous to seize on the innocence of the act 
common to both crimes as determinative. It is a strange inver-
sion that a defendant who commits an act that is the essential 
and crucial element of two crimes can be punished twice if 
that act by itself is innocent or the defendant's intent and 
objec~ are inno~ent but can .be ~)Unished. o~ly once if the 
comnion act or the mtent and obJe~bve are crImInal. 
~obriner, J., and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
splitting a course of conduct into multiple violations of the same 
statute whenever there is a doubt as to the propriety of such fragmenta-
tion. (In re Johnson (1966) 65 Cal.2d 393, 395 [54 Cal.Rptr. 873, 
420 P.2d 393].) 
Neal's "intent and objective' , test also governs sentencing in cases 
of multiple convictions for both an inchoate crime (e.g., burglary, con-
spiracy, solicitation, and like offenses that in fact and by definition are 
committed not as ends in themselves but as preparation for the eonsum-
matio~ of a further criminal purpose) and substantive crimes committed 
in execution of the inchoate purpose. There may Le no single external 
" act ' , necessarily common to the preparatory offense and the ultimate 
offense to bring the case precisely within the preclusion of section 654, 
but by application of the "int~nt and objective' , test the legislative 
purpose expressed by that section is effected. Illustrating this application 
of Neal are People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Ca1.2d 748, 760-762 [26 Cal. 
Bptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449] (burglary with intent to commit larceny anc1 
the larceny); People v. Hicks (1965) 63 Ca1.2d 764, 765-766· [48 Cal. 
Rptr. 139, 408 P.2d 747] (burglary with intent to commit sexual felonies 
and the consummated sex offenses); In re McGrew (1967) 66 Cal.2d 685, 
688 [58 Ca1.Rptr. 561, 427 P.2d 161] (same); In re Crull (1966) 64 
Cal.2d 178, 180-181 [49 Cal.Rptr. 289,410 P.2d 825] (conspiracy to com-
mit grand theft and grand theft) ; In re Romano (1966) 64 Cal.2d 826, 
828 [51 Cal.Rptr. 910, 415 P.2d 798] (conspiracy, burglary, and theft) ; 
In re Pratt (1967) 66 Cal.2d 154, 156 [56 Ca1.Rptr. 895, 424 P.2d 335] 
(kidnaping for the purpose of robbery and robbery); In ,.e Malloy 
(1967) 66 Ca1.2d. 252, 256 [57 Cal.Rptr. 345, 424 P.2d 929] (same). 
Examples need not be multiplied; the principle is plain. (See Twice in 
Jeopardy (1965) supra, 65 Yale L.J. 262, 319; Kirchheimer, The Act, 
the Offense, and Double Jeopardy (1949) supra, 58 Yale L.J. 513, 518; 
ALI Model Penal Code Proposed Official Draft (1962) 11.07(1) (b), 
and Tent. Draft No.5 (1956) Comment to former 11.08 at pp. 37-38.) 
